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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
PlaintifFAppellee
vs.
ROGER J. ALIRES,
:

Case No. 990483-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a Judgment for the conviction of Telephone Harassment,
entered after a jury trial by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, judge presiding. Jurisdiction is
conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26 (2)(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(f) (1996). See Addendum A (judgment and conviction).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS
OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in admitting, for "identification" purposes,

Alires' attempt to break into Brimhairs apartment earlier in the evening and in finding
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that the same evidence was more probative than prejudicial.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Admission of prior crimes evidence is examined
under an 'abuse of discretion' standard. See State v. Decorso. 370 Utah Adv. Rep 11
(1999). Clarifying this standard, the Utah Supreme Court has reasoned that "admissions
of prior crimes evidence must itself be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the
proper exercise of that discretion." Id.
2.

Whether the trial court erred when it admitted Brimhall's statements, made

to Officer Candland, in violation of Alires' right of confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An appellate court reviews a determination of
constitutional admissibility of evidence under a "correctness" standard. See generally
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
3.

Whether the trial court erred when it admitted out-of-court statements

Officer Candland overheard during a telephone conversation allegedly between Alires
and Brimhall as "non-hearsay" ruling it was not offered for the truth of the matter.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "To the extent that there is no pertinent factual
dispute, whether a statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted is a question of
law, to be reviewed under a correction of error standard." State v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332,
335 (Utah 1993)(citmg Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 1993)).

2
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PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
1.

Alires' request to exclude evidence regarding his attempt earlier in the

evening to break into Brimhairs apartment, on the basis that it is evidence of "other
crimes" pursuant to Rule 404(b) and more prejudicial than probative pursuant to Rule 403
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, is preserved at R. 2-3.
2.

Alires' request to exclude out-of-court statements made by Brimhall in

violation of Alires' right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution is preserved at R.
20., 26-27, 61.
3.

Alires' request to exclude out-of-court statements Officer Candland

overheard during a telephone conversation allegedly between Alires and Brimhall as
"hearsay" is preserved at R. 41, 53-54.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules, and constitutional provisions will be determinative of
the issues on appeal:
Amendment VI, United States Constitution (See Addendum B)
Art. I, § 12, Utah Constitution, Rights of Confrontation (See Addendum B)
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence
3
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Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. NATURE OF THE CASE,
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
In an Information dated August 7, 1998, Salt Lake City ("the City") charged
appellant Roger Alires ("Alires") with Telephone Harassment, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.030.
A jury trial was conducted on February 22, 1999. During the trial, against Alires'
objections, the trial court allowed the City to introduce, for "identification" purposes,
Alires' attempt earlier in the evening to break into BrimhalFs apartment R. 2-3. In
addition, the trial court allowed into evidence, as "excited utterances", several out-ofcourt statements made by Brimhall who was not present at the jury trial. R. 7-8, 17-21.
Finally, the trial court allowed into evidence, as non-hearsay, out-of-court statements
Officer Candland overheard during a telephone conversation allegedly made between
Alires and Brimhall. R. 41, 53.
The jury rendered a verdict convicting Alires of Telephone Harassment. Alires
appealsfromthe Judgment entered on April 12, 1999.

4
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED EVIDENCE. FOR
"IDENTIFICATION" PURPOSES. ALIRES* ATTEMPT EARLIER IN
THE EVENING TO BREAK INTO BRIMHALL'S APARTMENT.
On July 19, 1998, at around 10:40 p.m., Tiffany Brimhall ("Brimhall") contacted
the Salt Lake Police Department ("SLPD") and reported that Alires was trying to break
into her apartment. Officer Gilbert Salazar ("Officer Salazar") of the SLPD was
dispatched to Brimhairs apartment to investigate. R. 27.
When Officer Salazar arrived at the apartment, he encountered Alires banging on
one of the windows of Brimhairs apartment. R. 27-28 Officer Salazaar questioned both
Alires and Brimhall and after verifying that Alires had no warrants allowed Alires to get
some personal property from inside the apartment and then allowed Alires to leave. R.
28-31.
Officer Salazar was not present when Brimhall received the telephone call at issue.
R. 31-32. Accordingly, Officer Salazar had no personal knowledge regarding who called
Brimhall. R. 32. Moreover, Officer Salazar had no personal knowledge regarding what
was said between the caller and Brimhall. R. 32.
n. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED OUT-OFCOURT STATEMENTS MADE BY BRIMHALL IN VIOLATION OF
ALIRES* RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION UNDER THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE I. SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Later that same evening, at around 12:30 a.m., Brimhall contacted the SLPD. R.

5
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33. Officer Jill Candland ("Officer Candland") was dispatched to Brimhall's residence to
investigate. R. 33. When Officer Candland arrived, she encountered Brimhall and
noticed that she was tearful, her voice was shaking, and she was upset "to the point of
being . . . [in] shocking disbelief. R. 36. Brimhall told Officer Candland that Alires had
just telephoned and threatened her with a knife. R. 36-37.
While Officer Candland was questioning Brimhall, the telephone rang. R. 38.
Brimhall answered it and stated to Officer Candland, "It's him". R. 38. Officer
Candland put her ear to the telephone and listened to the conversation between Brimhall
and the caller. R. 38.
Brimhall was not present at the jury trial to testify regarding these statements made
to Officer Candland. R. 9, 44.
IIL THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED OUT-OFCOURT STATEMENTS OFFICER CANDLAND OVERHEARD DURING
A CONVERSATION ALLEGEDLY BETWEEN ALIRES AND BRIMHALL
AS "NON-HEARSAY"
During the conversation, Officer Candland overheard the caller tell Brimhall three
times that "if she did not take him back, if he could not be with her and his daughter, he
would kill her." R. 40. In addition, Officer Candland overheard the caller tell Brimhall
"that she would need to watch the day care." R. 40-41. After hearing this, Officer
Candland advised the caller that his threat was overheard and that he should stay away
from Brimhall. R. 41. The caller hung up. R. 41 Brimhall had no caller identification.
R. 45 However, the telephone call was traced to a public telephone. R. 46.
6
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Officer Candland had not seen Alires since 1989. R. 43-44. In addition, Officer
Candland had not heard Alires' voice since 1989. R. 43-44 Officer Candland was not a
voice recognition expert and was not able to recognize the caller as that of Alires. R. 44.
Moreover, the caller never identified himself as "Roger" or "Alires". R. 45
On August 7, 1998, Alires was charged with "Telephone Harassment" pursuant to
§ 11.08.030 of the Salt Lake City Code. During November 1998 a jury trial was
scheduled. R. 2. However, Brimhall failed to appear to testify. R. 2. The jury trial was
rescheduled to February. R. 2. On February 22, 1999, a jury trial was conducted and
Alires was found guilty.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Alires was charged with Telephone Harassment. In connection with such charge,
the City is required to prove each element of the offense, including identifying Alires as
the individual committing the offense.
The trial court erred when it admitted, for "identification" purposes, Alires'
attempt earlier in the evening to break into Brimhairs apartment. Although evidence of
other crimes is admissible for "identification" purposes, "identification" evidence is
evidence that evinces a similarity, i.e., a similar pattern or fashion between a wrong an
individual has previously committed and a wrong an individual is presently accused of.
Accordingly, since the City failed to show that Alires always broke int$ BrifrihalFs
apartment prior to calling her, the Court misconstrued the "identification" exception and
7
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allowed in excluded evidence.
The trial court also erred in admitting out-of-court statements made by Brimhall in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
12 of the Utah Constitution since Utah Supreme Court precedent requires a finding of
witness "unavailability" before admitting hearsay evidence. Brimhall did not testify at
trial and the Court made no determination that she was "unavailable".
Finally, the trial court erred in admitting out-of-court statements, overheard by
Candland, that were made during a telephone conversation allegedly between Alires and
Brimhall. The trial court ruled that these statements were non-hearsay since they were not
admitted to prove the truth of the matter. However, the statements were not admitted for
any specific purpose. In fact, these statements were admitted as substantive evidence.
Accordingly, the statements are considered hearsay and should have been excluded.
Even if non-hearsay, the statements are more prejudicial than probative.

8
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ARGUMENT
POINT I; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED AS
EVIDENCE, FOR "IDENTIFICATION" PURPOSES, ALIRES' ATTEMPT
EARLIER IN THE EVENING TO BREAK INTO BRIMHALL'S
APARTMENT AND IN FINDING THAT THE SAME EVIDENCE WAS
MORE PROBATIVE THAN PREJUDICIAL,
A, The Trial Court Erred When It Admitted Evidence. For "Identification"
Purposes. Alires' Attempt Earlier In The Evening To Break Into BrimhalPs
Apartment Since Evidence Did Not Show A Similar Fashion Or Pattern.
Pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
[ejvidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident.
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evid.; see also Decorso. WL 357192, at *4; State v. Shickles.
760 p.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988); State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987); State
v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). In Shickles. the Utah Supreme Court
reasoned that the general rule prohibiting evidence of other crimes "was established, not
because that evidence is logically irrelevant, but because it tends to skew or corrupt the
accuracy of the fact-finding process." Shickles. 760 P.2d at 295. Accordingly, "evidence
of other crimes is inadmissible unless it tends to have a special relevance to a
controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose other than to show the defendant's
predisposition to criminality." IdL In the present case, the trial court admitted, for
"identification" purposes, Alires' attempt earlier in the evening to break into BrimhaU's
9
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apartment. However, the trial court misapplied the "identification" exception of Rule
404(b).
1.

"Identification" Evidence is Evidence That Evinces A Similarity,
i.e., A Similar Pattern Or Fashion, Between A Wrong An Individual
Has Previously Committed And A Wrong An Individual Is Presently
Accused Of.

In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court held that evidence from an earlier prosecution
of a defendant, that he forged a check drawn on the individual account of a "Cary
Montoya", was admissible in a separate prosecution against him for burglary of church
checks. Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1075. Specifically, the Court ruled that a store clerk's
testimony that the defendant presented himself as "Cary Montoya" and cashed a check on
"Cary Montoya's" account, was probative on the issue of "identity". Id. In reaching its
decision, the Court reasoned that the evidence showed a "common scheme" where
defendant forged both checks, on both accounts, on the same day, using the name of
"Cary Montoya". Id.
Applying the above Utah case law, it is apparent that "identification evidence" is
similar to a "fingerprint". "Identification" evidence is evidence that indicates an
individual currently being prosecuted for a crime, is the individual who committed the
crime, because he has committed other crimes in a similar fashion, manner, or pattern.
For example, suppose there is an issue of identification in a rape case where the
perpetrator tied the hands and legs of the victim with tape and left a note beside the
victim, written in blue pen, and signed "Cassanova". Evidence that the defendant being
10
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prosecuted for the crime has been convicted of a rape done in a similar fashion with a
similar note could be admitted as evidence for "identification" purposes because of the
similarities between the two crimes.
In this instance, the "identitity" of who called Brimhall was at issue. Applying the
above, evidence that Alires always (or even sometimes) broke into Brimhairs apartment
before calling Ms. Brimhall could constitute "identification" evidence. Similarly,
evidence that Alires always (or even sometimes) called Brimhall a pet name, when
addressing her on the phone, would constitute "identification" evidence. However, no
such evidence was admitted at trial. Instead, the trial court admitted evidence of Alires'
attempt to break into Brimhairs apartment earlier, under the "identification" exception,
reasoning that because Alires was there earlier in the evening - it could be inferred that he
must have been the one who called her later that evening. However, this evidence did not
evince any similar fashion, pattern, or "common scheme". Since this evidence did not
constitute "identification" evidence, it should have been excluded as evidence of other
crimes pursuant to rules 402 and 404 (b).
B. Even Assuming That Evidence Was Admissible For "Identification" Purposes
The Trial Court Still Erred In Admitting Evidence As More Probative Than
Prejudicial
Even if evidence of other crimes is probative of a particular element of a crime and
is not offered merely to show criminal predisposition, such evidence is not automatically
admissible undar Rule 404(b). See Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evid.; see also State v.
11
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O'NeiL 848 p.2d 694, 701 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence provides that "[although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id. Regarding the factors to be evaluated
in the balancing process, the Utah Supreme Court has reasoned:
The problem is not merely one of pigeonholing, but of
classifying and then balancing. In deciding whether the
danger of unfair prejudice and the like substantially
outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of
matters must be considered, including the strength of the
evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the
similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has
elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the
efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering
hostility.
Shickles. 760 P.2d at 296.
In the present case, evidence of Alires' attempt earlier in the evening to break into
Brimhairs apartment does not aid the prosecution in proving any of the elements needed
to prosecute Alires for Telephone Harassment. There was no evidence presented at trial
that Alires' had access to or used any telephone during the time of the attempted break in.
Furthermore, there was no evidence presented at trial that Alires in anyway used
threatening words toward Brimhall at this time. In fact, the only evidence presented at
trial was evidence that Alires was trying to break into Brimhairs apartment window to
12
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retrieve his personal belongings, was Brimhall's boyfriend, was the father of BrimhalPs
child, and that Brimhall was frightened by Alires' actions. Accordingly, this evidence
was presented simply to appeal to the juror's sympathies, arouse their sense of horror,
and provoke their interest in punishing Alires in violation of Rule 403. See Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.. 605 p.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds.
McFarlandv. SkaggsCos.. Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
In fact, there was a real possibility of a different outcome if the evidence had not
been admitted. Had the evidence not been admitted, the only evidence presented in this
case would have been hearsay evidence introduced through Officer Candland's
testimony. However, Officer Candland had no personal knowledge regarding who the
caller was and never identified Alires as the caller. With the introduction of the evidence
of Alires breaking into the apartment the jury was allowed to make inferences, i.e., Alires
lived at Brimhall's apartment - Alires was Brimhall's boyfriend - boyfriends and
girlfriends fight - Alires was trying to break into the apartment - thus Alires and Brimhall
must have been fighting (otherwise he would not have had to break in) - Brimhall called
the police because Alires was trying to break into the apartment - Alires was mad that
Brimhall called the police - so Alires called to threaten her. It was these compounding
inferences that allowed the jury to infer Alires was the caller. It was these compounding
inferences that convicted Alires.
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POINT II ADMISSION OF BRIMHALL'S STATEMENTS VIOLATED
ALIRES' RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION UNDER THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE h SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION,
In this matter, the City sought to introduce Brimhairs statements, made to Officer
Candland, under Rules 802 and 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 802 provides
that "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules." Rule 802,
Utah Rules of Evid. However, rule 803 provides that "[a] statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition" is not excluded by the hearsay rule." Rule 803, Utah Rules of
Evid.
In the present case, Officer Candland testified that when she first encountered
Brimhall she was tearful, her voice was shaking, she was very upset, and she was in
shock or disbelief. R. 36. Over Alires' objections, the trial court ruled that these
statements were "excited utterances". Assuming Brimhairs out-of-court statements are
"excited utterances", admission of the statements must comport with the confrontation
clauses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution, Article I, Section 12.
A. Admission of Brimhairs Statements Violated Alires' Right Of Confrontation
Under The Sixth Amendment Since The United States Supreme Court And Utah
Supreme Court Precedent Still Requires A Finding Of "Unavailability" And
Brimhall Was Not An "Unavailable" Witness.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States
14
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through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." see Idaho v.
Wright 497 U.S. 805, 813 (1990); Cov v. Iowa. 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988). The United
States Supreme Court has reasoned that "[i]f a court were to read this language literally, it
would require, on objection, the exclusion of any statement made by a declarant not
present at trial." Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). Therefore, in interpreting this
phrase, the Court has reasoned that the Confrontation Clause does not necessarily
prohibit the admission of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant. Idaho, 497
U.S. at 813.
In 1980, in Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the United States Supreme Court
set forth a "general approach" implying that all hearsay is subject to some limitations
under the Confrontation Clause. IdL at 65. The Court laid down a two-step inquiry to
determine whether admission of hearsay statements met the requirements under the
Confrontation Clause:
[i]n sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation clause normally
requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of
reliability5. Reliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence [fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception.
Id. at 66; see also State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108, 1112 (1989). The two-step inquiry was
followed in subsequent cases raising Confrontation Clause and hearsay issues. Idaho v.
Wright. 497 U.S. 805, 815 (1990).
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However, in 1986, in United States v. InadL 475 U.S. 387 (1986), the Court
limited the scope of Roberts reasoning that Roberts did not stand for the "radical
proposition that no out of court statement can be introduced by the government without a
showing that the declarant was unavailable." Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394. Specifically, the
Court held that the unavailability requirement set forth in Roberts did not apply to
incriminating out-of-court statements made by a non testifying co-conspirator. Id. at 399400.
Following Inadi, the Court in White v. Illinois. 497 U.S. 805 (1990), held that the
Confrontation Clause does not require a finding of witness "unavailability" before
admitting testimony under the spontaneous declaration hearsay exception. White, 502
U.S. at 356-357. In making its decision, the Court reasoned that:
while an unavailability rule would therefore do little to
improve the accuracy of factfinding, it is likely to impose
substantial additional burdens on the factfinding process. The
prosecution would be required to repeatedly locate and keep
continuously available each declarant, even when neither the
prosecution nor the defense has any interest in calling the
witness to the stand
White. 497 U.S. at 355 (citing Inadi. 475 U.S. at 398-399).
Lower state courts have criticized the holdings in Inadi and White. In State v.
Ortiz, 845 P.2d 547 (Hi. 1993), the Hawaii Supreme Court, rejecting the holding of Inadi
declined to admit excited utterances without a showing of the declarant's unavailability.
The Hawaii Supreme Court reasoned that:
[a] showing of the declarant's unavailability is necessary to
16
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promote the integrity of the fact finding process and to ensui e •
fairness to defendants. Although excited utterances have
certain guarantees of reliability, we also recognize that the
right to confront an accuser should not be abandoned simply
because the alleged incriminating statement was made
spontaneously.
Ortiz. &h I ii ;il '"' • ' loivou'i «f«' " State v. Storch. h\? Ni; ^ c! H^ ('Ohio 1993),
Ohio's Supreme Court observed that:
White has met with criticism because it lim t
^
confrontation to situations in which the extrajudicial
statements are not covered by well-established exceptions to
the hearsay rule. If the statement falls within one of the wellestablished exceptions to the hearsay rule, no right to
confrontation with the declarant exists, if White is to be read
literally.
Although White acknow
e extreme value of crossexamination to a reliable fact-finding process, the opinion
states, as if it is obvious fact, that cross-examination would
aid the process of arriving at the truth very little in those
circumstances involving a well-established exception to the
hearsay rule. This statement is not obvious fact to many who
have litigated such cases.
Storch, 61? NF 2<x .u • >

^.^oi dingly , the Ohio Supreme * mil1 it'dsonnl lli.'il While_,>

»I < 1111" I < * 11111' • 11 1| ' > • " I ' • •' *" »«I. i (i • I«t v finding pin vi defd] less protection for 'the accused than
the protection provided by 'the Sixth Amcmlim nf as traditionally construed and by the
express words of Section 10. Ai tick 1 ol the i Uno t institution """ Id.
I

i Ill mi In in in in nil tipped i »i(i:iii tin I mi'illi "l n| i n i H ' ( 11 UP mi I lli,!i i i i i | ) l i c i l l \ rejected "the

holdings oflnadi and White. See State v. Carter. 888 I'.Jd bl1) {Utah 1995); State v.
Menzics, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah. 1994). cert, denied. _

U.S.

, 115 S.Ct. 910 (1995);
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State v. MoosmaiL 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990). In Moosmaiu decided after Inadi. the
Utah Supreme Court, appearing to ignore the holdings of Roberts. Inadi. and White,
fashioned its own two-part test when evaluating the extent of a violation of the right of
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. See Moosman. 794 P.2d at 480. According
to Moosman. a determination must be made regarding whether the presentation of
hearsay testimony of extrajudicial statements or occurrences is "crucial" to the
prosecution's case or "devastating" to the defendant. Id at 480. Then, a court must look
at the availability of the declarant and whether the presence of the declarant will add any
probative value to the evidence by allowing the trier of fact to observe the demeanor of
the witness. IdL
Moreover, in Carter, decided after Inadi and White, the Utah Supreme Court,
apparently ignoring Moosman. reaffirmed the two-part test set forth in Roberts.
Specifically, the Court held that testimony from a prior sentencing proceeding was
admissible at a later proceeding if witnesses were "unavailable" and prior testimony had
sufficient indicia of reliability. Carter. 888 P.2d at 646.1
Applying the above, it appears that the Utah Supreme Court, following other state
courts, has implicitly rejected the holdings in Inadi and White - deciding instead to
fashion its own test and reaffirm the two-step test laid out in Roberts. Accordingly, it is

1

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also appears to continue to use Roberts, ignoring
the holdings set forth in Inadi and White. See Crespin v. State of N.M. 144 F.3d 641 (10th Cir.
1998)(holding that non-testifying accomplice's confession did not qualify for admission against
defendant as statement against accomplice's penal interest).
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Applying Moosman Brimhall's Testimony Was Crucial To The
Prosecution's Case and Devastating To Alires.
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IIown.n Brimhall had no caller identification and
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Candland, who testified regarding the statements Brimhall made, had not xci. u^e^ or
heard his voice SUM. I'W
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recognition expert and was not able to recognize the voice of the caller as Alires. R. 43'11 Accordingly, Brimhall9s testimony was crucial to the prosecution case Brimhall's
testimony would not ha\ e been cumulative evidence, See Ecker v. Scott,
\995)(r

ling cumulative -^Aw

audicbbm^ - portion oi Uu, prosecution's cas>_ ~

lie defense has in-

r
M

^ -

not intend to dispute or does not intend to dispute, might be admitted more readily than
testimony not sharing these tliaiai kiislu s) , ihr was lln

!iil\ iiiii imdii;il llliiil » mil I

recogni ze \lires' '\ oice and affirmatively establish "that it was Mi Alires making the
phone call
2.

Applying Moosman and Or...

iiiiiili.ill \\ ,11, Nm "

(I hmnLibk '

Witness
Following the holding, in Roberts, the Utah Supreme Court has reasoned that, for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause, "a witness is 'unavailable' if a good faith effort
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was made to secure the witness' presence at trial." Carter. 888 P.2d at 646 (citations
omitted).2 This requirement is characterized as "stringent". Id. Specifically, the Utah
Supreme Court has held that "in order for a witness to be constitutionally unavailable, it
must be practically impossible to produce the witness in court." ]d. (citations omitted).
In State v. Drawn. 791 P.2d 890 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied. 804 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1990), this Court determined that a search consisting of successfully serving
subpoenas on each witness, attempting to make personal contact with each witness, and
questioning police informants, searching police files, and working with investigators to
locate each witness complied with the hearsay exception unavailability requirements.
Conversely, in State v. Case, 752 P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert denied. 765
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988), overruled on other grounds. State v. Lovell 758 P.2d 909, 912,
914 (Utah 1988). this Court stated that although the state sent a subpoena to the witness,
which she acknowledged receiving, had personal contact with her "approximately eight
times" before trial, and attempted to keep close contact with her, die state's efforts were
not sufficient to show unavailability when the witness failed to appear for trial. Case. 752
at 356. This Court reasoned that "[a]t [the prosecutor's] disposal was the Uniform Act to
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From Without a State in Criminal Proceedings . . .

2

Roberts' second inquiry, whether or not evidence had "sufficient indicia reliability", is
not addressed in this appeal since pursuant to Roberts "sufficient indicia of reliability" can be
inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
Alires does not dispute, for the purposes of this appeal, the trial court's ruling that, under current
Utah law, the evidence could fall under the excited utterance exception.
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id at 357. See also State v. Chapman. 655 P 2d 1119 (Utah 1982)
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In the p r e s e t .asv. the trial court determined iimi i>i .n^,,. was available, staling
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F

1

she s no|

'•-• - the Cit\
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• "clear indications that the witness would not attend". fase„

752 P.2d at 357. First, BrimhalFs victim advocate, who had contact with her over the
course of several menuitestifying against
s e t t - n g^

-.« Heer» under the impression that b\
Brimhall h

.-.-.->• , * ;
, XUi mw on& •«*.- ury

j ^ 2 Knowing this, tlie City's efforts in securing BrimhalFs attendance at trial

were cursory and limited to a telephone call the w e e i m iinii 10 ihc inal \< 1

applying

Chapman and Case, the ( il\ s d f o n s wvw mil stiffiunil 1 1 iniiipli in nuln »1 ™i1 .i [.MM I l.i illi
effort was made to ensure Brimhall would be present at ti ial.
Moreover, Alires was prejudiced. Because Brimhall did not attend the trial to

It should be noted that in Drawn, Case, and Chapman, the courts were defining the term
unavailability pursuant to Rule 804(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. However, these cases
are applicable since the Confrontation Clause appears to require an even stronger showing of
unavailability and reliability than does Rule 804. See Ecker v. Scott, 69 F 3d 69 72 n.3 (5* Cir
1995)(considering "unavailability" under the confrontation clause of the federal constituiton).
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testify, the City's case was easier and cleaner. The City was not required to put Brimhall
on the stand to testify, and did not have to run the risk of possibly presenting an
unsympathetic, perhaps offensive witness to the jury. Rather, the City was allowed to
have a poised officer in uniform testify on Brimhairs behalf, a possible preferable
alternative to Brimhall. Furthermore, since this case involves a domestic dispute, the City
did not run the risk of having the jury hear any ulterior motives Brimhall might have had
for making the statements. In addition, the City did not run the risk of having the jury
hear evidence regarding the relationship between the two, i.e., other prior domestic
disputes that Brimhall may have begun. Brimhall "may [have feltJ quite differently when
[she had] to repeat [her] story looking at the man whom [she would] harm greatly by
distorting or mistaking the facts." See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019.
Finally, the trial court's admittance of Brimhairs out-of-court statements were not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Brimhairs testimony was in dispute and the jury
was prevented in the fact-finding process from evaluating her demeanor. The omission of
Brimhairs live testimony tipped the balance against Alires by allowing the city to build a
case against him around hearsay testimony and preventing Alires from confronting a
controversial witness. Accordingly, the conviction should be reversed and the case
should be remanded for a new and fair trial, omitting use of the unconstitutional hearsay
testimony.
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Admission Of Brimhairs Statements Violated Alires' Right Of
Confrontation Under Article L Section 12 Of The Utah Constitution Since
The Utah Constitution Requires A Finding Of Unavailability And Brimhall
Was Not An "Unavailable" Witness
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"[a] state may construe its own constitution more narrowly than the federal constitution
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assuming that foadi and white are controlling authority und si fe i i it a l ;: • ;: nstiti iti :: nal la w\
t

stitution

••'

•-

4

Interpreting even textually similar state constitutional provisions in a manner different
from federal interpretations of the United States Constitution is entirely proper. See e.g. Siau
H v e h 711 P.2d 264, 272-73 (Utah 1985); State v. Brooks. 638 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1 ^
see also State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219 n.8 (Utah 1988)( u choosing to give the Utah Constitution a
somewhat different construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating the state's
citizens from the bagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the
federal courts").
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this Court may hold that under the Utah Constitution, a finding of "unavailability", as
originally envisioned by the Utah Supreme Court when it first adopted the test in Roberts,
is required prior to admitting any out-of-court statements.
The protections offered in the Utah constitution are more expansive than that of
the federal constitution. This difference arises from the historical circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the Utah Constitution. At that time, Utah suffered federal
persecution of polygamists and their families. See Bradley, Hide and Seek; Children on
the Underground. 51 Utah Hist. Q. 133, 142 (1983). Because of this, Utah courts have
interpreted some Utah constitutional rights more broadly than similar rights under the
federal constitution. Thus, the provisions of article 1, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution have not always been interpreted in lockstep with the federal constitution.
See e.g.. State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 & n.5 (Utah 1988)(suggesting that the
right of self representation may be interpreted differently in Utah constitution than in
federal constitution); In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct. No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633,
645 & n. 14 (Utah 1988)(stating that holding was based independently on state
constitution).
Moreover, under the Utah Constitution, the right to confrontation has been
specifically protected by Utah Courts. See State v. Villarreal 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995);
State v. Kendrick, 538 P.2d 313 (Utah 1975) ("the rule has been laid down that the right
of a defendant to confront the witnesses against him is a fundamental right and is
essential to a fair trial."); see also State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 180 (Utah 1989)
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(dissent reasoii
insures not onl> that defendant can coiiiiom ma a ^ a ^ i s iace to iacc, but also that the
jury can see and hear the i witnesses in person to assess their credibility, " ); State v.
Mannion. 5 ' I1 V(J" | IK1*1!) | "Vu Ltki il llllwill tin; word 'conlionl docs not simply secure
to llic rii < iisrd the (Hiviirf.'i" ofc^aiiiiiiiii^ vvidn ss<;s in Ins IN IMII' IMII IS in .rilliiiiiiriiH i ol
the rule of'the common law, that in "'trial b> jui> the witnesses must be present before the
fury and accused, so that he may be confronted, that is, put face to face").
In State v. Aiii.

•

<-me Com 1: u\pit'v.Iy

articulated the scope oi the r!*Ut pursuant to Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution:
[w]hen confrontation is available the accused has an
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face
to face with the jury in order that they may look at him and
judge by his demeanor and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief Encompassed in this
right of confrontation is the procedural right of crossexamination

Anderson. 612 P.2d at 785; see also Webb., 779 P.2d at 11 ± i. iviun,uvei, in State \
Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985), the I Jtah Supreme Court'reasoned:
[T]he right to test the believability of a witness on crossexamination includes the right to show a witness possible bias
or interest. The exposure of a witness motivation in testifying
is a proper and important function of the constitutionality
protected right of cross-examination.
Leonard. 707 P.2d at 656,
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Finally, as previously discussed, it appears that the Utah Supreme Court has
implicitly rejected the holdings oflnadi and White and have sought to provide more
protection. See Moosman. 794 P.2d at 480; Carter. 888 P.2d at 646.
With the above in mind, Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution should be
interpreted as providing more protection than it's federal counterpart. Specifically, it
should be interpreted as requiring a finding of "unavailability". As discussed previously,
the trial court determined that Brimhall was not unavailable, stating "[i]t's clear,. . . she's
no[t] an unavailabe witness, she's available, she's just not here." R. 9. Accordingly, for
the reasons already discussed, Alires' conviction should be reversed and the case should
be remanded for a new and fair trial, omitting use of the unconstitutional hearsay
testimony.

POINT III; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED OUTOF-COURT STATEMENTS OFFICER CANDLAND OVERHEARD
DURING A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ALLEGEDLY BETWEEN
ALIRES AND BRIMHALL AS "NON-HEARSAY".
A. Out-Of-Court Statements Officer Candland Overheard During A Telephone
Conversation Allegedly Between Alires And Brimhall Was Hearsay Since It Was
Not Offered For Any Purpose Other Than As Substantive Evidence
Utah Rules of Evidence 801 (c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than the one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted." Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evid. However, if an outof-court statement is "offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether
it is true, . . [it is not] proscribed by the hearsay rule." State v. Olsea. 860 P.2d 332, 335
26
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therefore admissible if offered to support a defense of good faith).
In the present case, the trial court admitted several out-of-court statements,
through the testimony of Officer Candland, allegedly made by Alires and Brimhall
during a telephone conversation between the two. Specifically, the trial court admitted
the statements allegedly made by Alires that "if she did not take 1dm back, if he could not
be with her and his daughter, he would kill her." and that "she would need to watch the
day care." The trial court determined that these statements were not being offered for
"the truth of the matter asserted", i.e., that he would actually kill her. However, the trial
court made no determination regarding what "other purpose" these statements were
admitted for. In fact, these statements were admitted as substantive evidence.
Characterized as threats by Officer Candland, i.e., "he threatened", the jury most likely
took these statements at their "face-value", as substantive evidence, rather than using
them to determine a side issue in the case. Accordingly, these statements were offered
for the truth of the matter, were hearsay, and should have been excluded pursuant to rule
801 (c).
B. Even Assuming That Evidence Was Admissible As Non-Hearsay Since Not
Offered For Truth Of The Matter Asserted The Trial Court Erred In Admitting
Evidence Since It Was Unfairly Prejudicial.
Furthermore, even if offered for some "other purpose", the evidence may be
excluded because it is unfairly prejudicial. For example, in Shepard v. United States. 290
U.S. 96, 103-106 (1933), the court excluded a decedent's statement "Dr. Shepard has
poisoned me". IcL at 103-106. In making it's determination, the Court concluded that the
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cidal state of mind sin.ce suicide was a possible

explanation for dca u . • - nuwever, the Court reasoned in n iiiilii IIIM « .IS uie In 11111 IIIIIL
statement as one of beliei, for its truth. Id. But see, State v. Carlson, 638 P.2d 512 (Utah

J

• I -

11 u :

a

m these statements that .Hires, the alleged caller, actually intended to kill Brimhall.
h&sentially, regarding these statements as "one of belief \ "'as truth", punishing him, not
'lie liii.iiiiiissctl I iniiiiili.il 1

f

. . . . .. . v .

v. bad individual in need of punishment5 Had the*

»uiv ,

^luswas

.

2

would have been no evidence indicating that Alires, the alleged caller, had made any
"threatening statements'"

Accordingly, the city would not have met its burden to prove

nit of the crime

t.
CONCLUSION

\ lires respectfully requests that if this Count determines that the trial court erred in
admitting 111 nili'iit v In identification purposes, Alires attempt earlier =

evening to

break into Brimhall's apartment ") sliilrnirnlis mude h\ lliiiiiiiiliiiill (if>iiiiisl \lms n
violation, of Alires confrontation rights under 'the Sixth Amendment of'the United States

5

It should be noted "that these out-of-court statements could not have been
admitted under the "admission of a party opponent" exception to the hearsay rule since
Officer Candland testified that she was not a voice recognition expert and was not able to
recognize Alires voice as the caller. Thus no foundation was laid that the Alires was the
caller.
29
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and; 3) statements, overheard by
Officer Candland, made during a telephone conversation allegedly between Alires and
Brimhall, this Court should enter an order reversing the conviction and remanding this
case for a new trial.

. 4/1

Submitted this / h day of January, 2000.
KKtyTENR.ANG^/bS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 981916939 MO

ROGER ALIRES,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

JUDITH S ATHERTON
April 12, 1999

PRESENT
Clerk:
chrisc
Prosecutor: FISHER, T LANGDON
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ANGELOS, KRIS
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 11, 1970
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count: 11.13
CHARGES
1. TELEPHONE HARASSMENT - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/22/1999 Guilty
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of TELEPHONE HARASSMENT a Class
B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 49 day(s).
Commitment is to begin immediately.
Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 49 day(s) previously served.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Case No: 981916939
Date:
Apr 12, 1999
Defendant is given 6 montfea jail cts, to clear case.
Dated this ids

day of (^X }QA^Jc.
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The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
[Rights of Accused]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speed
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Section 12. [Rights of the Accused]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses
in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in
all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determinating whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use
of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

